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ABSTRACT
PROBLEM FRAMING: A REMEDY FOR INDECI S IVENESS IN
DECISION-MAKING?
SEPTEMBER 1999
MARY SEBURN, B.S., GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Icek Aizen
Difficulty and conflict results in indecisiveness
,
often causing an impasse in the decision-making process.
Two decision problems were presented under a positive,
negative or neutral frame under conditions of cognitive
load and no cognitive load. After making their decision
participants rated it for difficulty, completed a belief
elicitation and recognition task, and completed measures of
indecisiveness and need for cognition. Introducing a
framing bias in the option evaluation stage of a decision
problem slightly reduced indecisiveness, making the
decision less difficult to resolve. Adding cognitive load
also reduced indecisiveness. The current research suggests
and provides evidence that a predisposition to attend to
and consider all features of a problem correlates with
indecisiveness and that indecisiveness can be reduced by
contextual factors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What happens when decisions are difficult to make?
Frequently, when people are making decisions they become
uncertain and unable to chose between options. Across a
variety of situations, some individuals encounter
difficulties infrequently while others experience a more
global tendency to experience difficulty when making
decisions. Indecision often causes an impasse in the
decision making process, a common impediment to decision
making that can result in conflict and distress (Ferrari &
Dovidio, 1997; Harriott, Ferrari & Dovidio, 1996).
Ambivalence and uncertainty intrinsic to indecision
often result from an approach avoidance conflict (Lewin,
1935, 1938)
.
As an individual advances towards making a
decision, the positive and negative valences of the options
become stronger. Lewin postulated that as psychological
time to the decision decreases, the avoidance tendency
becomes stronger at a faster rate than the approach
tendency. As a result, the avoidance tendency eventually
overcomes the approach tendency, repelling the decision-
maker away from the decision. This conflict alternately
pulls the decision-maker in opposing directions, causing
indecisiveness and making the decision difficult to
resolve. This dilemma may be resolved by increasing the
gradient of either the approach or the avoidance tendency
until one eventually dominates over the other and decides
the course of action. Introducing a bias that makes either
positive or negative features of the problem more salient
is one possible way to raise the gradient of one tendency
enough to overcome the other. This may resolve the
approach-avoidance conflict and reduce indecision.
The main concern of this research was to explore ways
to reduce indecisiveness and the difficulty it creates in
decision-making. Specifically, I was concerned with
whether the introduction of a contextual bias into a
decision problem can reduce indecisiveness. A biased
consideration of options may make positive or negative
features more salient, and therefore more accessible.
Alternatively, a bias could cause the decision-maker to
give more importance to either the positive or negative
qualities. Specifically, features inconsistent with the
bias may receive diminished attention while bias-consistent
features may receive increased salience and importance.
Thus, anything that increases accessibility of certain
characteristics should direct a decision-maker toward a
particular alternative and thus reduce indecision. I
propose that biasing the decision-maker will reduce
indecisiveness, and diminish the difficulty often
experienced when making decisions. There are many factors
that can bias accessibility, salience, and importance of
the options of a decision, but this study focuses
specifically on the effects of problem framing.
The Effects of Framing on Decision
The outcome of a decision can be affected by a number
of factors: the number of options (Ganzach & Schul, 1995),
the descriptiveness of the outcomes (Shafir, 1993), the
level of risk associated with the outcomes (Fagley &
Miller, 1987; Klihberger, 1995) and even simply drawing
attention to missing but irrelevant information (Bastardi &
Shafir, 1998)
.
Framing research has consistently shown
that the manner in which options are framed or worded
influences the outcome of decisions. Framing effects
emerge when different wordings of the same problem result
in different decisions (see Beike & Sherman, 1998;
Kuhberger, 1998 for reviews)
. Although the actual
alternatives remain unchanged, people often make different
choices when the same alternatives are presented in
different ways. For example, framing options in terms of
gains is not equivalent to framing the identical options in
terms of losses, and in fact, can result in opposite
outcomes. Srmrlar reversals of preference have been shown
by framing options in terms of survival vs. mortality
(e.g., lives lost vs. lives saved, live vs. die), success
vs. failure, accept vs. reject, and award vs. deny.
Frequently, these types of frames are broadly categorized
as positive or negative frames.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) originally reported
framing effects in decision making. Their participants
were more willing to accept risks when they evaluated
options in terms of costs, but avoided risks when the same
options were described in terms of benefits. For example,
participants chose between two programs of intervention,
one worded as the saving of lives (a positive frame) and
the other worded as preventing the loss of lives (a
negative frame)
.
While the decision was factually the
same, decision-makers demonstrated risk aversion when the
options were framed in terms of gains, and risk taking when
the same options were reworded as losses. This finding has
been widely replicated (Frisch, 1993; Jou, Shanteau, &
Harris, 1996; Kuhberger, 1995, 1998; Kuhn, 1997; Li &
Adams, 1995; Takemura, 1993, but see Fagley & Miller, 1987
for null results) . Tversky and Kahneman were the first to
demonstrate the implications of changing a problem's frame,
that the wording of the decision problem could actually
reverse preferences for alternatives.
Shafir (1993) researched how framing effects alter the
outcomes of decision choices by framing a problem task as
one requiring either the acceptance of options or the
rejection of options. His problems involved a choice
between two alternatives; an "enriched" option that
consisted of equal amounts of both positive and negative
valence information, and an "impoverished" option
consisting of the same number of attributes all neutral in
valence. He found that the enriched options were more
likely to be both accepted and rejected, presumably because
the decision makers were biased towards positive features
when the decision was framed as accepting and biased
towards negative features when the problems were framed in
terms of rejecting, and the enriched option had more of
each feature than did the impoverished option. Shaf ir'
s
research again demonstrates that the wording of the
decision problem strongly influences the evaluation of the
problem's options.
Ganzach and Schul (1995) also investigated framing
effects. They manipulated the quantity of information in
the options available to their participants and framed the
choice as Shafir had done, as accepting or rejecting.
Their options all contained equal numbers of positive and
negative traits differing only in number of total traits.
Results from their research indicate that, as the quantity
of information about an option increases, so does the
likelihood of that option being both accepted by
participants in a positive frame and rejected by
participants in a negative frame.
Researchers investigating framing effects have
accumulated a large body of evidence detailing the effects
of problem framing on decision outcomes. Early research
showed clear and strong effects, while recent research has
produced smaller effects and occasionally inconsistent or
null results. The early research in framing used a small
set of the same problems, Kahneman and Tversky's Asian
Disease Problem most frequently. Later researchers
developed new and different types of framing problems
(risky, probilogical
,
goals, those involving life vs. those
involving property, etc.) and various types of options
(risky, enriched, vague, neutral, varying in number or
valence of features) , frames (gain/loss, positive/negative,
accept /re j ect ) , and decision outcomes, or task (choosing
the correct option, subjective judgments of options, choice
between two options, choice concerning a single option)
.
This increased heterogeneity of the problems and frames
used in research may account in part for the recent mixed
results. In the present research, I used positive and
negative frames in problems described by neutrally valenced
and enriched options varying in task; one problem involved
a decision concerning a single option, and the other
required a preference between two options.
I suggest that problem framing manipulates the outcome
of a decision by influencing the salience, accessibility,
or perceived importance of certain features of a problem.
Framing a decision negatively (in terms of rejecting or
losing, for example) increases attention to and salience of
negative features, and decreases the salience of and
attention paid to positive features. Likewise, framing a
decision positively (in terms of accepting or saving, for
example) directs attention to and increases reliance on the
positive dimensions of the information relevant to the
problem. This uneven weighting of the options makes either
positive or negative features more consequential in the
outcome of the decision; as a result, decisions made under
a frame should reflect bias in a direction consistent with
the frame.
Framing effects on decision outcomes can depend on
contextual differences in decision problems. Many
contextual factors may inhibit or magnify the effects of
problem framing. Factors enhancing framing effects include
increasing the quantity of information provided (Ganzach &
Schul, 1995), increasing the level of risk associated with
the available alternatives, and comparing risky with
riskless options (Kiihberger, 1998). Negative frames are
often more persuasive and result in larger frame effects
than positive frames (Fishbein, Ajzen, & McArdle, 1980;
Kuhberger, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1991, 1997).
Factors reducing or eliminating framing effects
include having to justify the decision (Miller & Fagley,
1991), providing decision-makers with a "causal schema" or
rationale for option ambiguity (Jou, Shanteau, &Harris,
1996), and increasing decision-makers' responsibility for
their decisions (Schoorman, Mayer, Douglas & Hetrick,
1994)
.
Another factor that reduces the effects of decision
framing is personal relevance or involvement, which
increases the depth of message or argument processing
(Fazio, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and inhibits framing
effects (see Takemura, 1993)
.
8
Cognitive Load and Framing
Distraction may interact with problem framing.
Decisions made under distracting conditions (i.e.,
cognitive load) should exhibit strengthened framing
effects. Previous research examined cognitive load as a
moderator to persuasion effectiveness and attribution
judgments (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Petty, Wells & Brock,
1976; Trope & Alfieri, 1997). Results of these studies
indicated that individuals operating under time pressure,
distraction, or other load conditions are more likely to
rely on heuristics or contextual cues when making
evaluations or decisions.
Decision makers under cognitive load may show
decreased performance on a more effortful task (fully
considering all options) and increased reliance on a less
effortful task (utilizing an available contextual cue, such
as problem framing)
. Imposing a cognitive load on a
decision-maker should make the decision more difficult to
resolve and may actually increase the effects of problem
framing
.
9
The Effects of Framing on Inder.i .gi v^n^ ss
Framing effects can be used as a tool for increasing
persuasion (Smith & Petty, 1996), guiding consumer choice
(Dhar & Sherman, 1996; Kardes & Sanbonmatsu, 1993),
determining investment and research fund allocation
(Schoorman, et
.
al„, 1994) as well as directing the
inferences drawn during legal questioning (Beike & Sherman,
1998; Heath & Tindale, 1994; Loftus, 1975). Framing
effects can be used to increase compliance with medical
advice (Johnson, Payne, & Bettman, 1988; Levin, Schnittjer,
& Thee, 1988), increase voting behavior (Greenwald, Carnot,
Beach & Young, 1987; Lavine, et . al., 1999) and aid the
reconstruction of eyewitness recollection (Loftus, Miller,
& Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Another potential
and beneficial use for problem framing may be to decrease
indecisiveness in decision-making. Research has shown that
problem framing biases decision-makers in predictable
directions but it has not been determined if framing
reduces indecision. This is an important question to
answer especially considering the myriad of difficult
decisions people encounter on a daily basis. Anything that
can reduce indecision has many applications.
10
The addition of a frame to a difficult problem should
provide a contextual bias for the decision-maker to rely
upon. An available bias should reduce the conflict and
uncertainty of trying to decide between equivalent outcomes
by directing the preferences of the decision-maker in the
direction of the frame. This may be enough to increase the
gradient of Levin's approach or avoidance tendencies until
the one overcomes the other and decides the course of
action. Any decision reached by reliance on a simple
heuristic should be easier than decisions arrived at
through deliberate evaluation of all options. A problem
frame provides such a bias. Therefore, framing a problem
in terms of positive or negative outcomes should result in
less indecision than facing the same problem without such a
frame. Adding a problem frame should lessen the difficulty
and ambiguity in decision-making and result in diminished
indecisiveness
.
Cognitive Load and Indecisiveness
In making difficult decisions;, people should be more
likely to rely on anything that biases their attention and
reduces the conflict and difficulty. While introducing
distraction to a decision problem increases the cognitive
11
effort required to resolve a problem, it has not yet been
shown that cognitive load actually increases the difficulty
reported in making the decision. The imposition of
cognitive load should result in more difficulty making the
decision. If cognitive load makes decisions more
difficult, then individuals making those decisions should
be especially likely to rely on any available biases.
Problem frame should interact with cognitive load, such
that the decrease in indecisiveness resulting from problem
framing would be especially strong for decision-makers
operating under distraction.
Individual Differences
Dispositional factors may make people more or less
susceptible to framing effects. Increased framing effects
have been reported when decision makers are in neutral
moods rather than positive or negative moods (Hirt,
McDonald, Levine, Melton, & Martin, 1999) and when research
participants are indifferent about the outcomes of the
decision (Frisch, 1993). Additionally, a frame consistent
with one's activated self-schema tends to increase framing
effects (Cacioppo, Petty & Sidera, 1982) . Tordesillas and
Chaiken (1999) reported that high introspection decreased
12
information processing, which has been shown to increased
framing effects for those participants (Takemura, 1993).
Dispositional factors can decrease framing effects as
well. Tykocinski, Higgins, and Chaiken (1994) reported
that self-discrepancy type determined frame effectiveness;
for actual-ideal discrepant participants a negative frame
was more effective, while a positive frame was more
effective for actual-ought discrepant participants. Being
high in need for cognition also inhibits the effects of
problem framing (Smith & Levin, 1996; Smith, & Petty,
1996)
.
Dispositional Indecisiveness
Another factor that may influence the effectiveness of
frame is dispositional indecisiveness. Some people
generally experience more difficulty making decisions than
others do. Previous researchers have defined
indecisiveness as a proneness to hesitate or procrastinate
when faced with a decision problem (Ferrari & Dovidio,
1997; Harriott, Ferrari & Dovidio, 1996). Indecisiveness
is generally explored within the context of various aspects
of mental health and personality variables (see Frost &
Shows, 1993) . The current research suggests instead that
13
indecisiveness is a measurable difference in the difficulty
with which people experience making decisions.
Some individuals may be predisposed to be more
deliberate than others are. This inclination would make
decisions more effortful and difficult. Others, however,
may be inclined to focus more on one side of a problem.
For example, one may attend primarily to either the
negative or the positive features, to the neglect of the
other. A dispositional bias that eliminates the need for
deliberation of inconsistent features should make it less
difficult to reach a decision. If this inclination towards
indecisiveness were measured, those who are most decisive
should show more bias, and therefore report less difficulty
than those who are indecisive, show less bias, and report
more difficulty.
Additionally, those who are disposit ionally indecisive
should be more susceptible to biases inherent in the
decision-making context. People who frequently encounter
difficulty in decision-making should readily seek out and
utilize ways to reduce the conflict. Harriott, Ferrari,
and Dovidio (1996) suggest that individuals who are high on
dispositional indecisiveness may be easily distracted and
influenced by situational cues. Providing a problem frame
for individuals high in dispositional indecisiveness should
14
result in a greater reduction m situational indecisiveness
than providing the same frame for individuals low in
dispositional indecisiveness
„
Need for Cognition
Individual differences in indecisiveness may be
related to Cacioppo and Petty' s (1982) concept of need for
cognition. They define need for cognition as the
propensity of an individual to pursue and enjoy thinking.
Individuals high in need for cognition presumably prefer to
deliberate all information before committing to a decision,
whereas those low in need for cognition may think about
decision features on a superficial level only, tending to
rely on heuristics or rules of thumb to guide their
choices
»
Need for cognition may or may not be related to
indecision and difficulty often encountered in decision-
makingo Individuals low in need for cognition, who do not
think extensively about a problem may report less
indecision and difficulty making decisions than people high
in need for cognition who think extensively about every
alternative. Alternatively, individuals who are high in
need for cognition may not perceive decision making as
15
difficult since they presumably enjoy the extensive
deliberation given to decision-making.
Need for cognition may also interact with the effects
of problem framing. Individuals low in need for cognition
may be more susceptible to the effects of problem framing.
Individuals who enjoy thinking may be less influenced by
anything that biases their evaluation and reduces the
necessary deliberation of options. Previous research has
reported that participants high in need for cognition were
unaffected by problem framing, while low need for cognition
participants showed expected framing effects (Smith &
Levine, 1996; Smith & Petty, 1996)
.
Alternatively, it is possible that individuals high
in need for cognition will be more susceptible to the
effects of framing. Individuals who enjoy thinking are not
necessarily unbiased thinkers; they simply think more. The
bias could be proportionate to the extent of deliberation
given a problem, resulting in more bias for those high in
need for cognition, and less bias for individuals low in
need for cognition. Therefore, individual differences in
need for cognition may magnify or diminish the effects of
problem framing.
The concept of need for cognition seems relevant in
this context but could have varied results. High need for
16
cognition could magnify framing effects if increasing
problem deliberation amplifies framing imposed bias. On
the other hand, if people who enjoy thinking are less
susceptible to biases, as previous research suggests, being
high in need for cognition could diminish framing effects.
In addition, differences in need for cognition may or may
not be related to differences in difficulty experienced
when making decisions. The inclusion of need for cognition
in the present research is exploratory in nature because
individual differences in need for cognition may be
potentially relevant to current objectives.
Hypotheses
The present study examined the effects of problem framing
on indecisiveness
, These effects were investigated under
distraction and with no distraction on individuals
differing in dispositional indecisiveness and need for
cognition
.
Decision
Replication of previous results was expected, indicted
by a main effect of frame on decision. Two problems were
17
designed to test this, a course and a roommate problem.
The course problem involved a decision to add (or drop,
depending on frame) a hypothetical course and the roommate
problem required participants to decide which of two
roommates varying in the number of features used to
describe each they would accept (or reject, depending on
frame) as a roommate. Based on Shafir's (1993) and Ganzach
and Schul's (1995) findings that participants were both
more likely to accept and reject "enriched" options and
options described by more features the enriched, or 9/9
person was expected to be both chosen most frequently in
the positive frame and rejected most frequently in the
negative frame. Similarly, for the course problem,
positively framed participants should add the course and
negatively framed participants should drop the course.
The effects of framing were expected to interact with
distraction, increasing in strength when presented under
conditions of cognitive load. Participants under cognitive
load in the positive frame should accept the 9/9 roommate
and add the course more than participants not under
cognitive load in the positive frame. Conversely,
participants under cognitive load in the negative frame
should drop the course and reject the 9/9 roommate more
18
than participants not under cognitive load in the negative
frame
.
Situational Indecisivenes s
A main effect of framing on was predicted for
situational indecisiveness
„ Introducing a frame should
bias the evaluation of problem features and thus decrease
indecisiveness. There should also be evidence of a main
effect of cognitive load; individuals under cognitive load
should report greater difficulty making decisions than
participants under no cognitive load. A Frame x Cognitive
load interaction is also predicted, as adding cognitive
load should further reduce situational indecisiveness when
combined with a frame. Participants given a positively or
negatively framed problem and put under cognitive load
should show a greater decrease in situational
indecisiveness than participants given the same frame who
are under no cognitive load.
A main effect of dispositional indecisiveness on
situational indecisiveness is predicted^, as people who
generally experience difficulty making decisions should
report greater difficulty making my decisions. In
addition, as people who experience difficulty making
19
decisions may be more inclined to use any available bias
than those who do not experience generalized difficulty in
decision-making, a Frame x Dispositional indecisiveness
interaction is expected. Participants given a frame who
are disposit ionally indecisive should show a greater
reduction in situational indecisiveness than participants
given a frame who are not dispositionally indecisive. Need
for cognition may interact with problem framing, by either
magnifying or diminishing the proposed reduction in
situational indecisiveness resulting from reliance on the
problem frame.
20
CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Overview
Participants considered two decision scenarios, one
required a choice between two potential roommates differing
in number of features used to describe each; the other
required a decision to add or drop a hypothetical course.
Both scenarios were framed in one of three ways: positive,
negative, or neutral (the frame for both scenarios was
always the same)
.
The first scenario of each packet was
presented under high cognitive load while the second
problem was presented without cognitive load. Participants
considered decision relevant information before making the
decision and then rated decision difficulty on a series of
seven point scales. In addition, several measures of
cognitive bias were obtained. Participants also completed
a six-item version of Frost and Gross's (1993)
Indecisiveness Scale and a five-item version of Cacioppo
and Petty' s (1984) Need for Cognition Scale. Presentation
order for each scenario (course and roommate) and potential
roommate (enriched, or 9/9 and unenriched, or 3/3) was
counterbalanced. All subjects were randomly assigned to
21
frame and cognitive load conditions in a 3 x 2 experimental
design
.
Participants
Ninety undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses
at the University of Massachusetts Amherst participated in
this study. Participants completed questionnaires in small
groups and received course credit for their participation.
Participants ranged in age from 17 to 38 (M = 20.3).
Twenty-two were male (24.4%), sixty-seven were female
(74.4%), and one did not report gender.
Materials
Frame Manipulation
The two scenarios were framed in three different ways:
positive, neutral, and negative. In the positive frame,
the problem was worded in a way to bias the subject to
attend to positive information in making the decision. In
the roommate problem, participants decided which person
they would accept as their roommate, and in the course
problem, participants decided if they would add the course
22
to their schedule. In the negative frame, the problem was
worded m a way to bias the participant to attend to
negative information. In the roormnate problem,
participants decided which person they would reject as
their roommate, while in the course problem they were asked
if they would drop the course from their schedule. In the
neutral frame, the problem was worded in a way that made
the positive and negative features equally salient. In the
roommate problem participants identified which of the two
potential roommates they would accept and which they would
reject, while in the course problem they decided if they
would add or drop the course. Participants received the
same frame for both scenarios. Frame manipulations are
listed in Appendix A and B.
Cognitive Load Manipulation
Participants experienced cognitive load during the
scenario presented first in the questionnaire packet only.
They were told this would mimic the distractions inherent
in everyday decision-making and were asked to mentally
rehearse and remember an eight-digit number during exposure
to the problem information, immediately following the
framing manipulation. They were asked to recall the number
23
before making their decision, so that cognitive load
existed only for exposure to the information, and not
during exposure to the framing manipulation or while they
made their decision. Participants experienced cognitive
load only for the scenario presented first in their packet
Problem Information
Pursuing the question of whether framing can make
decision making easier required a situation with some
degree of difficulty, which is not usually done in this
research area. Most problems used in similar contexts are
simple and easy, requiring little thought or cognitive
effort. In my attempt to construct a difficult
hypothetical decision, I came to question whether any
hypothetical decision can be truly difficult. I addressed
this by trying to make the problems personally involving
and relevant to undergraduates (dealing with roommates and
course selection) and by introducing cognitive load as a
distraction to make the decision more difficult.
Additionally, I tried to design a highly conflicted
situation by balancing the number and intensity of positive
and negative features. The valence of the decision
relevant information given for each scenario was
24
ambivalent. The information given m each problem was
pilot tested to ensure that undergraduates indeed perceived
each set of information as ambivalent.
Two combinations of traits selected from Anderson's
(1968) compilation of likableness ratings were used for the
roommate scenario. One set consisted of six traits, three
moderately positive (friendly, energetic, and interesting)
and three moderately negative (forgetful, restless, and
withdrawn)
.
The second set of traits consisted of eighteen
additional traits, nine moderately positive and nine
moderately negative.
Characteristics used in the course problem were
constructed by the experimenters and consisted of twenty
features, ten positive (e.g., inspiring, enjoyable, and
innovative) and ten negative (e.g., tedious, unorganized,
and boring)
.
See Appendix C for a complete list of the
traits and characteristics used.
Measures
Dependent Variable Measures
Decision. Participants indicated their decision for
the course problem (adding the course was coded as "1";
25
dropping the course was coded as "2") and for the roommate
problem (deciding to room with the 3/3 roommate was coded
as "1"; deciding to room with the 9/9 roommate was coded as
S ituational Indecisiveness
„
After indicating their
decision, participants completed several questions
assessing situational indecisiveness
, or the overall
difficulty experienced in making the decision. These
included ratings of confidence, hesitation, certainty, and
difficulty encountered in making the decision. Ratings
were indicated on seven-point scales. Individual scales
were scored so that higher scores on situational
indecisiveness are indicative of more indecisiveness
.
Bias Measures
Feature Listing Bias. After making each decision,
participants listed the traits or characteristics that came
to mind while they were considering the decision problem.
After completing the listing task, they identified each
listed attribute as positive or negative, and rated on a
ten point scale how important each was in making the
decision. This assessed the presence and extent of bias in
26
accessible beliefs as introduced by the problem framing.
Positively biased participants should list more positive
traits, and report them as more important in making the
decision than negative traits. Conversely, negatively
biased participants should list more features that are
negative and give them more weight than the positive
features. The listing bias was computed as the number of
negative features listed subtracted from the number of
positive features listed.
Recognition Bias. Participants also completed a
recognition task. They viewed a list of features, half of
which were the actual features presented as information in
the problem scenario and half of which were filler
features. Participants then identified the characteristics
that had described the potential roommate or course. The
list contained 48 traits for the roommate scenario and 40
characteristics for the course scenario. Participants
should choose features consistent with the framing bias
more frequently than inconsistent features. This variable
was computed as the number of negative features chosen
subtracted from the number of positive features chosen.
All features recognized were included in analysis
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regardless of whether they were actually used
descriptions
.
Individual Difference Measures
Participants completed a measure of dispositional
indecisiveness (adapted from Frost & Gross, 1993, in Frost
& Shows, 1993) . Sample items include I find it easy to
make decisions and I usually make decisions quickly.
Participants also completed a measure of need for cognition
(adapted from Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; reported in Epstein,
Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996) . Sample items include I
prefer complex to simple problems and I try to avoid
thinking in depth about something. Items were selected
based on high reliabilities on prescreen and pilot tests.
The complete scales used are listed in Appendix D.
The abbreviated Indecisiveness Scale was previously
used during a large prescreen session (n= 398) and in pilot
studies (n= 73) and proved to be reliable (Cronbach's Alpha
.75 and .96, respectively). Epstein et al. (1996) reported
the abbreviated Need for Cognition Scale to be internally
consistent (Cronbach's Alpha .73). Reliability
coefficients for the Need for Cognition and Indecisiveness
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scales in this study were similar to those previously
reported (a = .75 and .81),
Reactive Effects
To check for demand characteristics participants'
perception of the purpose and hypotheses of the experiment
were solicited, and they were asked if they felt any
expectations to respond in a particular way. There was no
evidence of demand characteristics in this study. To
further control for demand characteristics, the
experimenters were blind to the experimental condition of
any individual participant and read all instructions to
participants from a script. Additionally, some items were
worded for reverse scoring to minimize the response bias of
acquiescence. To further mitigate response bias, the
instructions made clear that there were no correct or
incorrect answers to these problems and that all responses
were to be kept anonymous. Following completion of the
questionnaire participants were thanked and debriefed.
29
CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Analysis
Data analysis incorporated univariate analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to identify differences between frame and
cognitive load conditions. Regression and correlation
analyses were used to identify the relationship between
participant's need for cognition and indecisiveness scores
and reported decisional difficulty, as well as to determin
the presence and direction of processing bias. Analyses
are reported separately for each scenario.
Decision
The majority of participants dropped the course
(57.8%) and decided to room with the 9/9 roommate (80%).
Participants in the neutral (no frame) condition should
have been equally likely to add or drop the course and
accept or reject the roommate,, This was found for the
course problem (fifty percent of participants in the
neutral frame added the course) but not for the roommate
problem (83.3% chose to room with the 9/9 roommate).
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Framing Effects
Analysis of participant's decisions did not replicate
the previously reported effects of framing on decisions.
ANOVA's of decisions did not reach significance for either
the course (F2,89=
.14, p<.56) or the roommate scenario
(F2,89 = .61, p<.54). Participants were somewhat more likely
to drop the course under the positive and negative frames
(Ms = 1.63 and 1.60) than under the neutral frame (M =
1.50). In the roommate scenario, participants made the
same decision under the positive and neutral frame
(choosing to room with the 9/9 roommate, Ms = 1.83 for both
frames) but under the negative frame participants were
somewhat less likely to choose the 9/9 roommate (M = 1.73).
None of these differences, however, reached statistical
levels of significance.
Dispositional Indecisiveness
Regression analysis revealed that dispositional
indecisiveness was not a significant predictor of
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participants' decision for either the course (R =
.10,
p<.37) or the roommate (R =
.08, p<.44).
Need for Cognition
Although there were no specific hypothesis concerning
the influence of need for cognition on decision, regression
analysis revealed that need for cognition was a significant
predictor of decision for the course (R = .48, p<.00) but
not for the roommate (R =
.05, p<.63). Participants low in
need for cognition were likely to drop the course (M =
1.80) while participants high in need for cognition were
likely to add the course (M = 1.25) regardless of frame
condition. There was little difference in the decisions of
low and high need for cognition participants in the
roommate scenario (Ms = 1.83 and 1.75, n.s.).
Frame by Need for Cognition Interaction
Analysis of variance revealed a marginally significant
Frame x Need for cognition interaction (using a median
split of participants need for cognition scores) for the
course decision (Fi, 84=2. 63, p<.08). Participants low in
need for cognition were less likely to drop the course in
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the positive and negative frame than in the neutral, while
participants high m need for cognition were less likely to
add the course in the positive and negative frames than in
the neutral frame (see Figure 1). Low need for cognition
participants in the neutral frame tended to drop the course
(M = 1.93) while high need for cognition participants in
the neutral frame tended to add the course (M = 1,13).
There was no significant frame by need for cognition
interaction for the roommate decision. There was a trend
for participants high need for cognition to exhibit the
expected framing effect of choosing the 9/9 roommate in the
positive frame and rejecting the 9/9 roommate in the
negative frame, but this was not significant (F2,5i= .96,
p<. 39) .
Situational Indecisiveness
Scores on the six measures of situational
indecisiveness (certainty, difficulty, etc.) were summed
to indicate participant's reported situational
indecisiveness. Scale reliability was high for both
scenarios, a = .87 for the course and a = .86 for the
roommate
.
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Framing Effects
Analysis of frame on situational indecisiveness
revealed a trend in the predicted direction for both
scenarios. Participants in the positive and in the
negative frame conditions reported less difficulty making
the decision than participants in the neutral frame
condition. While in the predicted direction, this effect
was not significant (for the roorrmate: with frame M =
22.57, without frame M = 25.23, difference = 2.67, Fi,89
=2.46, p<.12, mean for the course: with frame M = 22.02,
without frame M = 23.47, difference = 1.45, Fi^gg = .68,
p<.41) .
Cognitive Load
Analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect
of cognitive load on reported difficulty in the roommate
scenario only (Fi,88 = 3.33, p<.07) . The effect was in the
same direction for the course scenario, although it did not
approach significance (Fi,88 = - 40, p<.53). Results were
contrary to the initial prediction that participants under
cognitive load would report greater situational
indecisiveness than those not under cognitive load.
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Results indicate that cognitive load had the opposite
effect than was predicted; participants reported less
difficulty when under cognitive load than when not under
cognitive load. In retrospect, this result is not
inconsistent with my analysis- cognitive load may prevent
deliberation and encourage superficial processing, which in
fact would make the decision easier.
Frame by Cognitive Load Interaction
A Frame x Cognitive load interaction was expected on
decisional difficulty. Participants were predicted to
report less difficulty when given a frame than when not,
and this difference should be greater for participants
under cognitive load than for those not under cognitive
load. The roommate scenario did not provide evidence of a
frame by cognitive load interaction whereas the course
scenario did, but the interaction did not reach statistical
significance. The reduction of indecisiveness by problem
framing was in the predicted direction for the course but
the effects of cognitive load were opposite to what was
expected in the roommate scenario and did not reach
statistical significance for either.
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In the roommate scenario, participants reported the
most difficulty making the decision without a frame
(neutral condition, M = 27.40) than with a frame (positive
or negative, M = 23.67) when they were not under cognitive
load. This is consistent with the finding that
participants found decisions more difficult without
cognitive load. Participants under cognitive load also
reported more difficulty making the decision without a
frame (M = 23.07) than with a frame (M = 21.27), but the
reduction of indecisiveness associated with frame was
greater for participants not under cognitive load (see
Figure 2 ) .
Participants in the course scenario also reported more
difficulty in the neutral/no frame condition (M = 24.53)
than in the frame condition (M = 20.70) when under
cognitive load, but reported slightly more difficulty in
the frame condition (M = 23.33) than in the no frame
condition (22.40) when not under cognitive load.
Dispositional Indecisiveness
Participants high on dispositional indecisiveness
reported more difficulty making both decisions. Regression
analysis showed that indecisiveness was a significant
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predictor of situational indecisiveness (R = .24, =
.06,
p < .026 for course, R =
.29, R^ =
.08, p < .005 for
roommate). Further analysis using a median split of
participants' indecisiveness scores showed that the low and
high indecisiveness groups differed significantly for the
roommate problem only (Fi, gg = 7.70, p <.01 vs. Fi, 88= 1.18,
p < .28 for course problem). Highly indecisive
participants reported more difficulty making the roommate
decision while decisive participants rated the scenarios
approximately equal in difficulty.
Need for Cognition
There were only small relationships between need for
cognition and situational indecisiveness (R = .15, p<.15
for the course and R = .04, n.s. for the roommate).
Participants low in need for cognition reported slightly
more difficulty than did participants high in need for
cognition for both scenarios. This trend did not attain
statistical significance, however.
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Bias
Correlation Between Bias and Decisions
Feature Listing Bias. Feature listing was
significantly correlated with decision for the course (r =
.61, p<.00). Adding the course was associated with listing
more positive features about the course and dropping the
course was associated with listing more negative features
about the course.
Feature listing across both roommates was uncorrelated
with decision, but analysis for features listed for the 3/3
and 9/9 roommates separately revealed significant
correlations between feature listing and decision. Rooming
with the 3/3 roommate was associated with a more positive
listing for the 3/3 roommate (r = .21, p<.05). Likewise,
choosing to room with the 9/9 was associated with a more
positive feature listing bias for the 9/9 roommate (r =
,31, p<. 00)
.
Further analysis of the roommate bias revealed that
for participants under cognitive load, feature listing bias
was significantly correlated with decision for both
roommates (for 3/3, r = .40, p<.01; for 9/9, r = .33,
p<.03) but for participants under no cognitive load,
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listing bias was only marginally correlated with decision
for the 9/9 roommate (r =
.23, p<„l4) and not at all
correlated for the 3/3 roommate (r =
.04, p<.78). This
suggests that cognitive load may strengthen the
relationship between processing bias and decision.
However, there was no interaction between cognitive load
and feature listing bias for the course scenario.
Feature Recognition Bias. Feature recognition was
significantly correlated with decision for the course
scenario (r = .32, p<.00). Adding the course was
associated with recognizing more features that were
positive and dropping the course was associated with
recognizing more features that were negative.
Recognition bias across both roommates was uncorelated
with decision. Further analysis of each roommate
separately failed to find a relationship between feature
recognition and decision.
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Framing Effects
Neutral Frame. Participants in both scenarios showed
less bias (i.e., scores were closer to zero on the
measurement scale) in the neutral frame than in the
positive or negative frames (means are presented in Table
1) . In the course scenario, this trend was marginally
significant for the feature listing bias (F2,85= 2.58,
p<.08), but not significant for the feature recognition
bias (F2,87 =
.10, n.s,). In the roommate scenario, the
trend was not significant for recognition bias (F2,87 = 1 . 82
,
p<.70), and there was no difference between frames for
listing bias (F2,86 =
- 20
,
p<.82).
Further analysis for each potential roommate
separately revealed the same trend for listing and
recognition bias: Participants reported the most neutral
bias in the neutral frame condition. This was significant
only for recognition bias for the 9/9 roommate, F2,87 = 2 . 66,
p<. 08
.
Positive and Negative Frames. There was no systemic
bias resulting from the positive or negative frames. In
the roommate problem, participants were equally biased
under the positive and negative frames for recognition bias
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(Ms = 1.63), but for feature listing, participants reported
the most positive bias under the negative frame (M = 1.20)
and the least positive bias under the positive frame (M =
.70). In the course problem, participants reported the
most negative bias under the positive and negative frames
on both feature listing (Ms = -1.40 and -.80) and feature
recognition measures of bias (Ms = -.66 and -.67).
Participants reported the most negative bias under the
positive frame for both feature listing and recognition.
Cognitive Load
There were significant main effects of cognitive load
on both feature listing bias (Fi,i64 = 4.93, p<.03) and
recognition bias (Fi,i64= 4.00, p<.05) for all 180
participants across both scenarios. Regardless of framing
condition, participants under cognitive load were more
positively biased than participants not under cognitive
load (see Table 2 for means)
.
Further analysis for each scenario separately revealed
that participants reported significantly more positive bias
on both the listing and recognition (Ms = 1.96 and 1.89) in
the roommate scenario when under cognitive load than when
not under cognitive load (Ms = -.02 and -.31; Fi,87 = 9.83,
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p<.002, and Fi,88 = 4„04, p<.048)„ In the course scenario,
participants under cognitive load showed more positive bias
for feature recognition than participants not under
cognitive load (Ms = -,21 vs.
-.96), but showed little
difference on feature listing bias (Ms = -.70 vs. -.64).
Neither measure of bias differed significantly by cognitive
load for the course scenario.
Manipulation and Validity Checks
Demand Characteristics
No participant correctly identified the purpose of
this study or the major variables under investigation. A
few participants reported that they were expected to
provide certain answers but further reading of their
responses indicated that it is likely they were referring
to being required to make a response, and not any specific
response. Based on the responses to these questions it is
assumed that demand characteristics were not a problem in
this research.
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Problem Framing
If people are more accustomed to and therefore expect
positively framed information (Smith & Petty, 1996), they
might automatically rephrase a negatively or neutrally
framed problem into a positively framed question. To check
this, participants reported if they rephrased the question
they were asked. Participants reported rephrasing most
often in the negative frame for both scenarios (33.3% for
the course, 30% for the roommate)
.
Additionally, to see if participants could identify
their frame after completion of the questionnaire, they
were asked to restate the decision they had made. Two
coders judged whether participants correctly or incorrectly
identified their frame condition. If participants used the
frame in their response, it was coded as a correct
identification. For example, "I had to decide which person
I would accept as my roommate" was coded as a correct
identification for a participant in a positive frame (but
would have been coded as incorrect for participants in a
neutral or negative frame) . Frame consistent synonyms were
also coded as correct. For example, "I was asked if I
would sign-up for this course" was coded as correct for
participants in the positive frame (but again would be
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coded as incorrect for participants in a neutral or
negative frame)
.
More participants misidentified their frame for the
course (43„3%) than did for the roommate (26„7%)„ Negative
frames were misidentif ied more often than neutral or
positive frames for both scenarios. For the course
problem, the frame that was misidentif ied the most often
was the negative frame (n = 15, 50%) followed by the
positive frame (n = 13, 43.3%) and then neutral (n = 11,
36.7%). For the roommate problem the negative frame was
again misidentified most frequently (n = 10, 33.3%)
followed by the positive and neutral frames (n = 7, 23.3%
for both)
,
ANOVA revealed Frame x Cognitive load interactions on
this measure (see Figure 3) . This was highly significant
for the course, F2,84= 6,37, p<.00; and marginally
significant for the roommate, F2,83 = 2.74, p<.07. In the
course scenario participants under cognitive load
misidentif ied their frame most in the neutral condition (n
= 9, 60%), while participants not under cognitive load
misidentified the frame the least for the neutral frame (n
= 2, 13.3%). In the roommate scenario the opposite
occurred, the neutral frame was misidentified most in no
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cognitive load condition (n = 6, 40%) and the least by
participants under cognitive load (n=l, 6.7%),
Cognitive Load
To induce cognitive load, participants remembered an
eight-digit number. The average number of digits
remembered correctly was 7,77, This indicates that
participants attended to the manipulation and did rehearse
the number to themselves. Eighty-three of the ninety
participants (92%) remembered all eight digits correctly.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study was a first attempt to examine decisional
difficulty, or situational indecisiveness
, in the context
of biases in decision making^ Previous research has shown
that framing often influences preferences, but I wanted to
know if it made the decision conflict easier to resolve.
Data suggest that framing did reduce indecision in
decision-making, but the effects failed to reach
statistical significance. The present study was also
unable to obtain the predicted framing effects on decision
making. The decisions revealed no systemic effects of
adding the course or accepting the 9/9 roommate under a
positive frame versus dropping the course or rejecting the
9/9 roommate under a negative frame. Cognitive load was
predicted to make decision-making more difficult but data
reveal that cognitive load apparently reduces indecision
and difficulty overall. Cognitive load interacted with
frame and scenario, resulting in greater reduction of
indecision caused by framing for the roommate scenario
while the reduction of indecision caused by framing was
less for the course. Need for cognition showed no
significant relation to situational indecisiveness , whereas
dispositional indecisiveness correlated with situational
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indecisiveness. Thought listing valence revealed bias in
the direction of the decision for both scenarios, but
recognition bias correlated with decision only for the
course. Positive or negative frames did not influence
bias, but participants were more neutral on measures of
bias when given a neutral frame. Participants under
cognitive load were more positively biased, this was
significant for the roommate scenario. Overall, results
were weaker than expected, inconsistent across scenarios,
and failed to replicate previously reported framing
effects
.
The results of this study are difficult to interpret
for several reasons. First, the results unexpectedly
differed across scenarios, preventing generalization across
problems. This may be due to the roommate problem
involving person perception, which may require a different
process than decision-making concerning other topics. In
addition, the problems consisted of different types of
decision outcomes. The course involved a single choice, to
add or drop the course, whereas the roommate involved a
choice between alternatives, to decide which of two
potential roommates to accept or reject.
Second, despite repeated pilot testing, the data did
not exhibit the hypothesized framing effects. This
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indicates that framing effects are more complex and less
stable than originally assumed. This prevented a
meaningful test of the predicted interactions.
Unexpected results from negative frames may be
explained by previous research, but little is available to
explain unexpected results in the positive frame. For
example, negative frames are processed more carefully than
positive frames (Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, &
Lockhart, 1998; Smith & Petty, 1996) . Therefore,
negatively framed decision-makers may be less susceptible
to contextual or peripheral cues than positively framed
decision-makers. This may explain in part why participants
mean decision scores never dropped below the midpoint of
the decision coding (1.5 on a scale from 1 to 2; indicative
of a lack of negativity bias) but cannot account for
positively framed participants deviating more than
negatively framed participants from the expected decisions.
Alternatively, negatively valenced information has
been shown to receive more weight in person perception and
decision-making (Fiske, 1980; Tykocinski, Higgins, &
Chaiken, 1994), and therefore negative information may
weigh more heavily in decisions than positive information,
even in a positive frame. This could explain in part why
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positively framed participants deviated more from the
expected decisions than did negatively framed participants.
It is possible that framing effects were not observed
due to the more complex structural nature of the decision
problems. The situations used were more complex than those
traditionally used to study framing effects. Most framing
problems are simple, short, and uninvolving, with options
containing few pieces of information. For example, one of
Ganzach and Schul ' s (1995) framing problems included two
positive features and two negative features describing a
potential roommate. Participants then marked on a seven
point scale their "tendency to accept (or reject) the
described individual as a roommate". Shafir (1993) used
framing problems involving a simple choice between two
lotteries: a lottery with a 50% chance of winning $50, or a
lottery with an 80% chance of winning $150 and a 20% chance
of losing $10. Smith and Levin (1996) also used framing
problems requiring a simple choice between two treatment
alternatives each described by one brief sentence.
In addition, the problems involved a judgment (in the
course scenario) and a choice between riskless options (in
the roommate scenario) . Many framing problems in the
literature involve choice between risky alternatives.
Indeed, larger framing effect sizes are associated with
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choice involving risky alternatives (Kuhberger, 1998).
There are many plausible interpretations of why the problem
frames did not result in the expected framing effects „ No
one explanation discussed, however, can account for the
inconsistent pattern of framing effects uncovered.
A hypothesis of this study was that adding cognitive
load to a decision would increase the difficulty associated
with resolving that decision. Analysis revealed just the
opposite, that cognitive load decreased the difficulty
associated with making a decision. This indicates that
inhibiting deliberation reduces indecision and difficulty.
While this contradicts the original hypothesis, post hoc
deliberation of these findings makes sense and suggests
that this pattern of results is actually a reasonable (if
not initially obvious) outcome.
Dispositional indecisiveness and situational
indecisiveness were significantly correlated. This
relationship was theoretically expected and validated the
measures of both dispositional and situational
indecisiveness
.
A tentative hypothesis predicted a relationship
between need for cognition and situational indecisiveness,
but did not specify the direction of that relation. While
there was no significant relation between need for
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cognition and situational indecisiveness
, participants
high in need for cognition reported slightly less
difficulty than did participants low in need for cognition.
This suggests that being high in need for cognition may be
related to less difficulty in decision-making.
Additionally, need for cognition was significantly related
to decision for the course, but not for the roommate.
Participants high in need for cognition added the course
while participants low in need for cognition dropped the
course, regardless of frame. This suggests that features
used in the description of the course may have been more
appealing to individuals high in need for cognition than to
participants low in need for cognition.
A possible threat to external validity is the
assumption that a hypothetical decision problem can be used
to examine decision-making processes used in real life.
Difficult decisions made in everyday life are not
hypothetical and may generally be more complex than any
hypothetical problem used in research settings. To address
this issue, the problems used in this research were
constructed to be as complex as is possible for
questionnaire format. In addition, my participant
population consisted exclusively of undergraduates. This
is typical in social psychological research however, and
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there are generally no major problems generalizing the
results of such research to other populations.
Several aspects of the proposed results warrant
further research. It is apparent that framing effects are
not as stable or consistent as assumed. The contextual and
dispositional factors determining the presence of framing
need to be explored further. If problem framing can be
shown to reduce indecisiveness with statistical
significance, then it is a useful tool for decision-makers
and ways in which to apply this to a variety of settings
and types of decisions should be explored. Cognitive load
appeared to reduce indecisiveness. Future research may
explore the effects of different levels of distraction on
indecisiveness, as well as the possible applications and
limitations of this effect. Additional biases that may
reduce indecisiveness also warrant investigation, including
mood, priming and directed thinking.
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Figure 1. Mean course decision by frame and need for
cognition
.
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Figure 2. Situational Indecisiveness by frame and cognitiveload for course and roommate problem.
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Figure 3. Participants frame identification by frame and
cognitive load.
Course scenario
Cognitive load No cognitive load
Frame Frame
Roommate scenario
Cognitive load No cognitive load
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APPENDIX A
FRAME MANIPULATION FOR COURSE PROBLEM
It is the beginning of the semester. You have
preregistered for a number of courses but have not yet
finalized your schedule.
Positive Frame : Among other things, you are
considering adding an elective course for which you have
not yet signed up.
Negative Frame : Among other things, you are
considering dropping an elective course for which you have
already signed up.
Neutral Frame : Among other things, you are still
considering whether you should or should not take a
particular elective course.
You will base your decision whether or not to
include this course on your schedule on information about
the course that you found in a course guide prepared by
undergraduates. This guide summarizes evaluations and
comments from students who have taken the same course in
the past with the same instructor.
(cognitive load, if applicable went here)
Positive Frame : Based on the following information,
you must decide if you would add this course to your
schedule
.
Negative Frame : Based on the following information,
you must decide if you would drop this course from your
schedule
Neutral Frame : Based on the following information, you
must decide whether you would or would not include this
course in your schedule.
(description of the elective course came here)
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APPENDIX B
FRAME MANIPULATION FOR ROOMMATE PROBLEM
Imagine that you paid a security deposit on a very
nice off-campus apartment. However, you now learn that theperson who was to share the apartment with you will not be
coming back to UMass. You cannot afford to rent the
apartment without a roommate and, if you don't find one
you lose your security deposit and will have to look for
another place to live. Fortunately, it is still early and
there are many students who have yet to finalize their
living arrangements for the academic year.
Positive Frame: Your main concern is to make sure that
you accept a roommate who is right for you.
Negative Frame : Your main concern is to make sure that
you reject a roommate who is wrong for you.
Neutral Frame : Your main concern is to make the right
decision
.
After searching for a day or two, you learn of two
individuals interested in sharing your apartment and you
acquire some information about them.
(cognitive load, if applicable went here.)
Positive Frame : On the basis of the following
information, you must decide which individual to accept as
your roommate.
Negative Frame : On the basis of the following
information, you must decide which individual to reject as
your roommate.
Neutral Frame : On the basis of the following
information, you must decide which person to accept and
which person to reject as your roommate.
(descriptions of the two roommates came here)
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APPENDIX C
TRAITS USED IN ROOMMATE PROBLEM AND FEATURES USED TO
DESCRIBE COURSE
Traits used to describe
3/3 roommate:
friendly
energetic
interesting
forgetful
restless
withdrawn
Traits used to describe 9/9
roommate
:
confident
materialistic
sarcastic
kind
tense
sincere
cunning
open-minded
critical
neat
opinionated
creative
obstinate
cheerful
interesting
educated
strict
immature
Characteristics used to describe the course
work intensive
thought -provoking
tedious
inspiring
difficult
interactive
dry
formal
challenging
hands-on
en j oyable
demanding
boring
unorganized
interesting
unnecessary
worthwhile
innovative
uninspiring
educational
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APPENDIX D
DISPOSITIONAL INDECISIVENESS AND NEED FOR COGNITION
Indecisiveness Scale
Adapted from Frost and Gross (1993), in Frost and Shows
(1993)
1. I always know exactly what I want.
2. I find it easy to make decisions.
3. I have a hard time planning my free time.
4. When ordering from a menu I usually find it difficult
to decide what to get.
5. I usually make decisions quickly,
6. It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes
me a long time.
Items 1, 2 and 5 were reverse scored.
Need for cognition Scale
Petty and Cacioppo (1984), as adapted in Epstein, et al
(1996)
1. I don't like that I have to do a lot of thinking.
2. I prefer complex to simple problems.
3. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in
depth about something.
4. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking
abilities rather than
something that requires little thought.
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something
gives me little satisfaction.
Items If 3 and 5 were reverse scored.
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